here is an opinion-piece I wrote recently on the current political crisis in Ukraine (as of right now parliament has been officially shut down, although the leading opposition party refuses to accept the president's decision. There are demonstrations in Kyiv, nothing is getting done and the Ukrainian currency keeps dropping.) I'm not sure if it infringes copywright, but the following may be interesting for readers of this blog.

Ukraine’s Identity Crisis

Ukraine is fast approaching a full-blown identity crisis. Since the ‘Orange Revolution’ of 2004, the divide between the predominantly Ukrainian-speaking, European-oriented Ukrainians in the western part of the country and the predominantly Russian-speaking, Russian-oriented Ukrainians in the eastern part of the country has widened greatly. The difference between then and now is that Eastern Ukrainians have found their voice. As Ukrainians rush towards Independence Square in Kyiv, don’t expect to only see the orange flags of the western-based ‘Orange Coalition’. This time, the blue flags of the eastern-based ‘Region’s Party’ and even the red flags of the Communist Party will be displayed just as proudly.

The stand-off in Ukrainian politics is often cast as a battle of ‘civilisations’ between Western countries and Russia. In this analysis, both ‘civilisations’ compete to ensure that Ukraine remains one of their own. Although this is at least partly true, such a focus on geo-politics obscures the divisions that exist within Ukraine itself. The ongoing political crisis is more than simply a question of Ukrainian foreign policy: it is a debate over how Ukrainians will choose to define their young nation.

Since Ukraine declared its independence 15 years ago, Ukrainians remain incredibly divided over their national identity. Ukrainians argue over whether to recognize their past achievements as Soviets or whether to recognize those who fought for independence; whether they are European or Slavic; and whether Ukraine is a Ukrainian-speaking country, a Russian-speaking country, or both. For example, visitors to the Western part of Ukraine will find that monuments to the Soviet era have all been replaced with rediscovered Ukrainian heroes, but if they make their way to the eastern City of Kharkiv, they will likely be surprised to find a 20 metre monument to Lenin still standing in the largest square in Europe.

More than anything else, language will be what surprises visitors the most. The Ukrainian constitution stolidly declares the Ukrainian language to be the only official language of Ukraine, yet this hardly reflects reality. Although the Ukrainian language is meant to be used in government, visitors to Kyiv will be surprised to hear the Russian language spoken in the streets, shops, bedrooms, and boardrooms. Indeed, with the notable exception of Lviv, the Russian language is common in most large cities in Ukraine, no matter Western or Eastern. Meanwhile, amongst Ukrainians who do speak Ukrainian, divisions exist as to what is the ‘true’ Ukrainian language.

None of this is being written to belittle Ukrainians or to expose their flaws. Rather, it is to serve notice to readers in the West that the political crisis in Ukraine, which has continued to grow since the ‘Orange Revolution’, cannot be attributed to meddling by Russia alone. Lenin stands tall in the City of Kharkiv because Ukrainians living there are not yet willing to take him down. Readers should understand that the current political crisis is not simply a case of the ‘Orange Coalition’ boldly trying to triumph over undue Russian influence. It is better to understand this crisis as a battle that is taking place primarily amongst Ukrainians themselves. The pertinent question for Ukrainians now is whether they will be able to find some way of accommodating their great diversity. If they cannot, it is difficult to see how they will avoid continuing to lurch from one crisis to the next.